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wheN respectiNg patieNts’ wishes 
puts them iN harm’s way
An ethical dilemma involves having to make a choice between alterna-tives that require compromising 
one or more ethical principles. Consider 
the situation of a debilitated yet competent 
adult patient who insists on returning to a 
home environment that health care profes-
sionals (HCPs) think is unsafe. Imagine 
that the patient cannot take care of her basic 
needs (for example, cooking, bathing, an-
swering the door, housecleaning), and that 
she has run out of money to pay for the help 
she would need to maintain a safe home en-
vironment for herself. She might qualify for 
Medicaid to pay for a nursing home stay, 
but not for the home care needed to keep 
her well cared for in her home. The patient 
is adamant that she would rather die in her 
own home than go anywhere else—particu-
larly a nursing home. 
In such a situation, two fundamental 
ethical obligations appear to be in direct 
conflict: (1) the duty to promote the 
patient’s well-being and protect the patient 
from harm and (2) the duty to respect the 
wishes of a competent patient. HCPs who 
become involved in caring for such a patient 
would be justifiably concerned that the 
patient’s well-being is threatened and that 
the potential for harm is great if she returns 
to her home under these circumstances. 
At the same time, HCPs may be troubled 
by the prospect of overriding the patient’s 
wishes.
The AMA Principles of Medical Ethics 
state that “[a] physician shall respect the 
rights of patients.” Among other rights, 
patients are acknowledged to have the right 
of self-determination. Of course, this hasn’t 
always been the case in American medicine. 
As recently as the 1950’s and early 1960’s, 
HCP’s were often quite paternalistic 
towards patients. In the context of complex 
shifts in social norms in the 1960s and 
1970s, patient autonomy became established 
as a dominant principle in bioethics. As a 
result, the patient’s status in the patient-HCP 
relationship has evolved to include patient 
involvement in medical decision making. 
But, does the right of patients to decide for 
themselves extend to the right to make a bad 
decision?
Patients have the right to define for 
themselves the values and goals that will 
determine their medical care. These values 
and goals inform decision making about 
specific medical interventions; e.g., deciding 
between alternative treatment approaches. 
To facilitate this right of patients to be 
self-determined, physicians should adopt 
a patient-centered approach, taking care to 
determine the patient’s values and goals 
of care, as well as eliciting the patient’s 
perspective on their illness. It is often 
difficult for physicians and other members 
of the health care team to accept patients’ 
decisions that depart from a professional’s 
recommended course of action, which is 
intended, of course, to benefit the patient. 
Even though such decisions may preclude 
benefit in a biomedical sense, decisions 
that are congruent with patients’ values 
and goals may benefit patients in other 
ways. Patient choices that endanger their 
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well-being and appear to conflict with 
their own stated values and goals are 
especially difficult to accept because 
they appear to be not only “bad” 
from the medical perspective but also 
irrational. It is important for physicians 
to identify the underlying cause for 
irrational decision making and approach 
it appropriately (Brock & Wartman, 
1990).
Many authors have expressed con-
cern that one consequence of overly 
strict adherence to the principle of 
patient autonomy is that other important 
principles (such as the duties to benefit 
and protect patients) receive insufficient 
priority. This imbalance might result in 
an inappropriately limited role for pa-
tients’ physicians in important medical 
decisions. The goal, it is argued, should 
be to strike a proper balance between 
autonomy and beneficence that would 
include a healthy respect for patient self-
determination without abandonment of 
the duty to benefit patients (Pellegrino & 
Thomasma, 1988). This approach would 
allow physicians a meaningful role in 
the patient-physician relationship and in 
medical decision making, one that in-
cludes looking out for the well-being of 
their patients while avoiding backsliding 
toward paternalism. In general, however, 
patient decisions are honored. This is 
true even if patient decisions are per-
ceived by their physicians to be “bad” 
or “irrational,” unless there is a threat 
of harm to a third party, an inadequately 
treated psychiatric illness, or a concern 
about capacity. Although concerns about 
patient capacity should not be limited 
to occasions when physicians consider 
patient choices to be “bad” or “irratio-
nal,” it certainly makes sense that such 
choices would raise these concerns. 
Methods of assessing decisional ca-
pacity typically identify several essential 
functional abilities and, in this way, 
differ from measures of mental status, 
such as the Mini-Mental State Examina-
tion. These abilities include making and 
communicating a choice; understanding 
relevant information about the medical 
situation; appreciating that the relevant 
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information applies to oneself in the 
situation at hand and, perhaps, in the 
future; and engaging in rational delib-
eration about treatment options and be-
ing able to describe why one particular 
choice was made, rather than another, 
based on one’s own values (Grisso & 
Applebaum, 1998). A bedside tool to 
evaluate capacity for treatment decisions 
is available and it has been empiri-
cally studied, yet time considerations 
may limit its widespread application in 
clinical practice (Grisso,Applebaum, & 
Hill-Fotouhi, 1997).
Some authors have argued for a flex-
ible standard with respect to decisional 
capacity: the idea that as the risk of 
harm increases, the criteria for capacity 
should accordingly become more strin-
gent (Buchanan & Brock, 1989). For 
example, it may not be sufficient that 
the patient has consistently expressed 
a strong desire to remain in her home. 
The patient should also demonstrate 
that she appreciates the potential harms 
she may encounter if she remains in her 
home. Also, while a patient’s consis-
tently stated preferences should be given 
proper consideration, the HCP should 
keep in mind that patient preferences 
may appropriately change over time or 
as circumstances change, and reassess 
accordingly. 
There are many possible responses to 
a patient who refuses treatment recom-
mendations. In particularly frustrating 
cases, some HCP’s are tempted to disen-
gage and accept patients’ decisions out 
of resignation or even anger. Although 
this approach may seem easier for the 
physician, it may not serve patients’ best 
interests. Alternatively, physicians may 
reject a patient’s refusal and attempt 
to impose treatment (e.g., transfer to a 
rehab facility) through whatever means 
available, including pursuit of legal 
options through the courts. In many 
states, in the absence of a mental illness 
associated with dangerousness to self 
or others, attempts to force placement 
or treatment against a patient’s will 
can only be pursued if the patient is 
deemed by a judge to be incompetent. 
Another response to treatment refusal is 
to explain the physician’s perspective to 
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the patient, attempting to persuade the 
patient to change his or her mind while 
avoiding manipulation or coercion. 
When a patient refuses the recom-
mended plan of care, physicians should 
regard such resistance as an opportu-
nity to initiate (or continue) dialogue 
in an effort to understand the patient’s 
perspective. What factors are contribut-
ing to the patient’s point of view and 
influencing her decision making? Have 
members of the health care team consid-
ered and explored religious beliefs, cul-
tural background, various psychosocial 
factors, previous interactions with the 
health care system, influential personal 
experiences, or the preferences of fam-
ily members or friends? The physician 
should determine the consistency of the 
patient’s choice vis-à-vis the patient’s 
values and goals. Is the proposed choice 
compatible with the achievement of 
those expressed goals? Is it the best 
choice to achieve those goals? For 
example, would the patient consider 
short-term treatment in a rehab facility 
to maximize her health and functional 
ability in order to achieve her ultimate 
goal of remaining in her home long-
term? Have all options been explored to 
provide home care assistance? Careful 
consideration of these issues could lead 
to better ways of communicating with 
the patient and, ideally, to better deci-
sions and outcomes.
Joseph A, Carrese, M.D., M.P.H.
Associate Professor of Medicine
Division of General Internal 
Medicine, Johns Hopkins Bayview 
Medical Center
Director and Blaustein Scholar, 
Program on Ethics in Clinical Practice, 
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of 
Bioethics Johns Hopkins University
This article was adapted with permission 
from the Journal of the American Medical 
Association from the article (published in the 
8/9/06 issue): Patients’ well-being and physi-
cians’ ethical obligations. “But doctor, I want 
to go home” JAMA. 2006;296:691-695. Copy-
right © (2006), American Medical Association. 
All rights reserved.
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the Maryland health care Ethics 
committee network co-sponsored 
a series of "journal club meetings" 
in October to show and discuss the 
documentary, “Health, Money & 
Fear.” The 50 minute documentary 
summarizes what is wrong with our 
health care system, and what we need to 
do to fix it. 
On December 3, 2008, MHECN co-
sponsored the conference, “Health Care 
Ethics Committees and Maryland Law 
– Time for a Change?” at Broadmead in 
Cockeysville, MD. See p. 11 (Box) for 
more information about this conference. 
In the summer of 2009, MHECN will 
present its bienniel basic ethics educa-
tion conference for ethics committee 
members. Information about this confer-
ence will be available in the Spring of 
2009. Contact info: MHECN@law.
umaryland.edu, (410) 706-4457..
the Montgomery county coalition 
for End of life care has recently 
created a simplified advance directive 
form that focuses on appointing a health 
care agent and identifying preferences 
for end of life care to inform the health 
care agent. The Coalition hopes that this 
form will be simpler to understand than 
the current Maryland living will form, 
and that it will support more effective 
end-of-life decision-making than a tra-
ditional living will. To request a copy of 
the form, e-mail Dr. Barbara Blaylock at 
b.blaylock@verizon.net.
the state Advisory council on 
Quality care at the End-of-life met 
on October 10, 2008. The Council 
discussed a memorandum generated to 
compare Maryland’s Life-Sustaining 
Treatment Options (“LST”) form 
(formerly the “Patient’s Plan of Care 
Form”) to the Physician Orders for 
Life-Sustaining Treatment (“POLST”) 
form.  The POLST is a physician’s 
order while the LST form is a document 
expressing the patient’s current 
treatment preferences with the hope 
that physicians' orders will be generated 
that are consistent with those treatment 
preferences. For more information about 
the Council’s meetings and activities, 
visit http://www.oag.state.md.us/
healthpol/SAC/index.htm.
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health care reform:  
uNiNteNded coNsequeNces of regulatioN
The last issue of the MAEC 
Newsletter featured a summary 
of talks given at a conference 
that MHECN sponsored on April 
7, 2008, entitled “The Ethics of 
Health Care Reform.” A central 
theme that ran through many of 
the talks was that of improving 
the “cost-effectiveness” of 
our health care system. Here, 
Rebecca Elon provides a note 
of caution regarding unintended 
consequences of health care 
reform efforts intended to control 
costs.
“It is your duty to devote yourselves 
to your patients and your practice. If 
you are diligent in your work, society 
will reward you amply. You should be 
interested in medicine, not money. If it 
is money that interests you, go work on 
Wall Street.”
With that rebuke, my 80 year-old elder colleague left the room. I was left behind with 
15 second-year medical students who 
had been discussing the various salaries 
they could expect to earn in different 
medical specialities after graduation. 
My colleague had been a private attend-
ing physician at the academic teach-
ing hospital since the mid 1950’s. He 
practiced during an era when medicine 
was a sovereign profession with more 
moral authority than economic power. 
Today, however, the opposite seems 
true. Medical students cannot understand 
the vast health care industry they are 
entering without reading the Wall Street 
Journal in addition to the New England 
Journal. Many medical students are 
leaving their training with $150,000 or 
more in educational debts, and finding 
that primary care fields and jobs with 
underserved populations may not allow 
them to service their academic debts 
and live the lifestyle they believe they 
should be entitled to enjoy. Instead of 
entering fields in which they are inter-
ested or which they believe to be good 
for society, many graduates are enter-
ing fields that will minimize their hours 
worked per week and maximize their 
earning potential. 
In the absence of a healthy social cov-
enant, can we blame them? We as physi-
cians have become a constantly hurried 
and harried group of “piece workers.” 
Since we are paid by the visit or the 
procedure, as the payment per “piece” 
falls, the only way to maintain income in 
the face of rising costs is to increase the 
volume of services provided. Patients 
have become our means of production. 
Since each “piece” of work has become 
devalued, physicians must perform 
higher volumes to meet their budgets. 
For example, if a primary care physician 
does not make 24 to 30 billable visits 
per day, he may not be able to meet his 
overhead expenses. The non-reimbursed 
aspects of care, such as case manage-
ment and communication, fall by the 
wayside. Since medicine has become 
commodified, there is less emphasis on 
doctor patient relationships, and more 
emphasis on the elements within the 
interaction that serve to justify the reim-
bursement. Both physicians and patients 
are feeling discontent within the cur-
rent status quo. Both groups blame “the 
system.” How did we get here? Why is 
our health care system too expensive, 
uncoordinated, lacking in prevention, 
with inadequate continuity of care and 
care coordination? Why are those who 
deliver care, those who receive care, and 
those who pay for care all dissatisfied? 
If we look back historically, we find that 
it is past reform efforts that have led us 
to where we are today. Consider the ex-
amples listed below (see Box) of some 
unintended consequences of laws or 
regulations affecting health care delivery 
in the U.S.. 
Current efforts at health care reform 
often punish good people working with-
in bad systems. American physicians 
and health care workers today often feel 
under siege and victimized by reform 
efforts foisted upon them. The dominant 
“-ism” of modern secular American 
life may in fact be “regulatarianism,” 
in that we seem to believe that most of 
the ills of our society can be corrected 
or reformed through the promulgation 
of more and more governmental regula-
tions. Regulations are now expected 
law/regulation Unintended consequence
Social Security 
Act 
(1935)  
Encouraged the expansion of the private pay, for-profit LTC 
industry.
Hill Burton Act
(1946)
Encouraged expansion of institutional capacity in the care for 
frail elders and disabled persons.
Medicaid  
legislation 
(1965)
Shifted financial responsibility from family to state for care of 
elders; became a form of universal institutional LTC insurance.
Medicare  
legislation 
(1965)
Medical inflation 1970’s to present followed by cost control 
efforts 1980’s to present (e.g., DRG/PPS, physician fee setting); 
earlier hospital discharge; growth of sub-acute care nursing 
home beds created cost shifting to LTC; physicians limiting or 
opting out of Medicare.
DRG – diagnostic related groupings (a form of prospective payment)
PPS – payment for performance
LTC – long-term care
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to tell us how to do the right thing the 
right way. In former times, it was our 
religious upbringing and/or educational 
training that taught us how to do the 
right thing the right way. As physicians, 
our professionalism guided our actions 
and formed the governance structures 
in medicine. In American health care 
reform, however, the dominant 20th and 
21st century ethos of professionalism is 
increasingly yielding to federal regula-
tarianism. 
A couple of years ago I received a 
notice from Medicare that I had tripped 
the “99214 wire.” The warning letter 
claimed that I was an outlier relative to 
my peers, billing too high a percentage 
of my outpatient visits at the higher level 
code. The letter warned that I should 
be absolutely sure that my documenta-
tion justified such billing since tripping 
the wire placed me at risk of audit. Of 
course, I was an outlier relative to my 
internal medicine peers! I am a geriatri-
cian. I cared for more people over the 
age of 90 than below the age of 60. We 
scheduled 30 minute follow up visits for 
this population. 
Although I felt we were in compli-
ance with our billing practices, this letter 
caused me to experience significant 
anxiety every time I sat down to write a 
chart note. We were still using 19th cen-
tury paper charts. I wanted to document 
more than usual, which took me more 
time. Still, I could not be sure that I had 
documented all the requirements each 
time to bill at what was the appropriate 
level based upon the time involved. I 
felt compelled to under code the visit, 
and bring myself into alignment with 
my internal medicine peer group, for 
fear of having an audit conducted on my 
work. I knew people who had undergone 
audits, and it was an absolutely awful 
process, even if in the end they were 
vindicated. My down coding resulted in 
increasing financial pressure on me from 
the hospital that owned our practice. The 
budget had become an unsolvable prob-
lem for me in a fee for service Medicare 
environment. I could not provide high 
quality care and meet budget. 
I quit the practice at the age of 53, to 
try to find a different way of providing 
quality care for frail elders in commu-
nity settings.* I convened a symposium 
for all the hospital sponsored geriatric 
medicine programs in the Baltimore 
Washington area about how to drop out 
of Medicare. I was making plans to do so 
myself. Medicare, it seemed to me, had 
become one of the biggest obstacles for 
providing quality care to frail elders.
The current call for accountability 
in medicine cannot be met by payment 
schemes such as pay for performance. 
Pay for performance schemes are 
reductionist, and do not capture over-
all quality of care. For example, if an 
insurance company plans to pay more 
to a physician whose diabetic patients 
have Hemoglobin A 1 C (blood sugar) 
measurements below 7% rather than to 
the physician whose diabetic patients 
have an average Hemoglobin A 1 C of 
8%, the insurance company may be in-
advertently rewarding a physician whose 
patients are less challenging and more 
adherent to their medical plans of care. 
The physician may have “cherry picked” 
his patients, and turned away the more 
challenging patients who would threaten 
his ability to meet the benchmark. The 
physician with the worse performance 
measure may have worked skillfully and 
much harder with more difficult patients 
to have achieved the poorer number. The 
8% may reflect an improvement for the 
difficult patients from 9% or 10% and 
actually represent a remarkable achieve-
ment. But if the benchmark is 7%, the 
physician will not be rewarded for his 
diligence and good work.
Med Chi, the Maryland Medical Soci-
ety, recently held a series of symposia to 
teach primary care physicians in the state 
what is expected of them from pay for 
performance criteria from various insur-
ers and national organizations measuring 
quality of care. The presentations were 
overwhelming to the attendees (myself 
included). Most small practices cannot 
invest the time required to learn all of 
the differing requirements and do not 
have the infrastructure to collect and 
report the information being requested. 
Medicare was surprised that in the first 
year only 16% of physicians partici-
pated in the voluntary Product Quality 
Research Institute (PQRI) measures that 
could result in up to a 1.5% increase in 
payment. Most small practices do not 
have the capacity to capture and report 
the requested information. 
The momentum in medicine is toward 
increasing industrialization and consoli-
dation. Small practices will need to find 
ways to work collectively and collabora-
tively in the data collection functions. 
Whether the concept of ‘accountable 
care systems’ will be able to connect 
small practices and provide the needed 
infrastructure is uncertain. Small prac-
tices may be destroyed over time and 
be replaced by larger corporate owned 
practices that have the infrastructure to 
do the reporting that is currently being 
requested on a voluntary basis, but may 
well be mandatory in the near future.
As Derek Bok said in his book, The 
Trouble with Government, “Even the 
most perfectly crafted compensation 
scheme cannot ensure a perfect balance 
between cost and quality of care. Medi-
cal care requires innumerable judgments 
for which there is no one obvious an-
swer.”  Similarly, health care reform re-
quires innumerable judgments for which 
there is no one obvious answer. As 
current discussants describe the Ameri-
can health care system as “a mess,” it is 
useful to remember how we arrived at 
the current messy situation. The answer 
lies in the efforts of reform movements 
of the past, with all of their intended and 
unintended consequences. Our current 
system of health care in America can 
perhaps be defined as the sum of the in-
tended and unintended consequences of 
past legislative, judicial and regulatory 
Cont. on page 9
The current call for accountability in medicine cannot be 
met by payment schemes such as pay for performance. Pay for 
performance schemes are reductionistic, and do not capture 
overall quality of care. 
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philosopher's corNer: what do we meaN By dignity?
In contemporary bioethics, few moral terms are more invoked and less defined than “human dignity.” 
The phrase first appeared in the English 
language in 1225, but its meaning is 
anything but settled.  In the context of 
physician-assisted suicide, for example, 
human dignity has been used by parties 
on both sides of the issue to mean quite 
different and sometimes contradictory 
things.  Opponents of physician-assisted 
suicide argue that the practice under-
mines the dignity (worth) of elderly and 
disabled patients, while defenders of 
physician-assisted suicide claim that the 
practice respects the dignity (autonomy) 
of patients.  Competing uses of dignity 
also appear in discussions about stem 
cell research, human enhancement, and 
cloning.  
The term dignity plays a central role in 
a number of recent bioethics documents 
as well, including the President’s Coun-
cil on Bioethics report entitled Human 
Cloning and Human Dignity (2002), 
the Council of Europe’s Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and 
Biomedicine (1997),  the World Health 
Organization’s Ethical, Scientific and 
Social Implications of Cloning in Human 
Health (1997), and UNESCO’s Univer-
sal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights (1997). None of these 
documents, however, set forth a defini-
tion of dignity.
In their defense, one might argue that 
dignity is a simple concept that does not 
require definition. However, the very 
fact that people on opposite sides of a 
given issue can appropriate the term to 
advance their agenda suggests that our 
ordinary way of talking about dignity 
is confused and vague.  If dignity is to 
exhibit any moral force in bioethics, it is 
important to understand its history and 
possible meanings. 
The word dignity comes from the 
Latin root dingus, meaning worthy. Its 
earliest English meaning referred to a 
person’s rank.  According to this pre-
Enlightenment understanding of the 
word, kings, bishops, and noblemen had 
dignity; commoners did not.  Dignity 
was variable; it could be gained or lost, 
depending on a person’s status at any 
given time. Though this view of dignity 
largely vanished during the Enlighten-
ment, it still persists today when one 
talks about honoring dignitaries based 
on their elevated status.
A second meaning of dignity can be 
traced to Aristotelian notions of virtue. 
Dignity of this kind applies to people 
who exhibit, through their actions, 
excellent character.  Unlike dignity 
based in rank, this version of dignity has 
nothing to do with hierarchy. A slave 
stripped of the rights of citizenship 
could maintain dignity of this sort if he 
comported himself in a virtuous manner. 
People who possess this form of dignity 
often exhibit qualities like perseverance, 
composure, self-respect, decency, and 
fairness. 
During the Enlightenment, an egali-
tarian notion of dignity surfaced that 
granted dignity to all humans regardless 
of rank or virtue. This type of dignity is 
concerned with the equality of lives, not 
the quality of lives (Meilaender, 2008). 
It starts from the premise that all hu-
mans have permanent and equal worth, 
either because they are made in the im-
age of God (the theological account) or 
because of some quality of their human-
ness (the philosophical account).  
A fourth meaning of dignity, which 
emphasizes autonomy and free choice, 
grew out of the Kantian idea that people 
have dignity by virtue of being rational 
selves capable of making and applying 
universal moral laws. In the West, this 
vision of dignity generally is invoked 
to protect individual choice and self-
determination.  This use of dignity is so 
pervasive in American bioethics that at 
least one critic has questioned whether 
dignity ever means anything other than 
autonomy (Macklin, 2003). 
A fifth meaning of dignity, rooted in 
communitarianism, suggests that dignity 
can operate as something other than 
autonomy.  This approach to dignity, 
which is more traditionally found in Eu-
rope than America, focuses on what kind 
of society best protects the dignity of 
humanity on the whole. It places limits 
on individual choices in order to protect 
the excellence of humanity and avoid its 
degradation. 
As these various meanings demon-
strate, dignity is a multifaceted concept.  
It is far easier to invoke than to define 
or defend.  The challenge is to articulate 
what we mean when we use the term. 
Anything less will jeopardize our ability 
to appeal to dignity in a normatively 
meaningful way. 
Leslie A. Meltzer, J.D., M.Sc.
Health Law & Bioethics Fellow
Law & Health Care Program
University of Maryland School of Law
Baltimore, MD
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case preseNtatioN
cAsE stUdY FRoM A 
MARYlAnd hosPitAl
Mr. P. and his daughter are hop-ing that his daughter’s kidney is a match for him. However, 
in the screening process, testing revealed 
that his daughter is not genetically 
related to him. Neither Mr. P. nor his 
daughter know this. The transplant team 
consults the ethics committee, inquiring 
whether they should share this informa-
tion with Mr. P. or his daughter. If so, 
should the wife be approached first?
coMMEnts FRoM An 
Ethics consUltAnt
I asked quite a number of my col-leagues in healthcare concerning the question about what to tell the 
woman wanting to donate her kidney to 
her father who, it turns out, is not her 
biological father and that presumably 
neither she nor the father knew of this 
circumstance.* Almost to a person the 
reaction was to tell the daughter she 
was not a match and then just leave it at 
that. When I asked for a reason for this 
almost instinctual response, I generally 
heard something about privacy, stirring 
up trouble, or perhaps that it was not 
relevant to the question of whether the 
daughter was an optimal donor. I would 
like to tease out a bit some rationale for 
making any decision about sharing the 
information about paternity. I have three 
questions.
First, who is the primary responsible 
agent? The answer seems to be the 
transplant clinician or whoever is the 
designated person who conveys the tis-
sue matching results. Looking beyond 
that clinician, we might also say that 
the mother is also a moral agent who 
may be accountable for actions, but in 
the immediate situation, the agent who 
has primary responsibility is the one 
with special knowledge and very private 
information, and who may have the 
responsibility to take some action in a 
morally responsible way.
The second question is to whom is 
the primary moral agent responsible? 
Clearly, there is an important responsi-
bility to the daughter who has submitted 
to a medical procedure in providing the 
blood sample for matching. Looking 
beyond the responsibility to the daugh-
ter, the clinician also has a responsibility 
to the father, who is a potential recipient 
of a kidney and who is suffering from 
chronic kidney disease. But it does 
seem that the primary responsibility is 
to the daughter who entrusted her blood 
sample to clinicians for matching with 
her father. Within the immediate medical 
sphere, the mother is not involved.
Finally we have to ask for what is 
the clinician responsible? It seems to 
many of the people I informally polled 
the answer to the "what?"question is 
to provide the medical response to the 
question, “Can I donate a kidney to my 
father? Am I a good match?” The most 
straightforward response is that of many 
of my colleagues: “On the basis of the 
lab test you are unable to donate a kid-
ney to your father because you are not 
a good match.” Of course the concern 
with this response is what if the daugh-
ter asks why she is not a good match?  
Also, is there some good medical reason 
for the response to be, “On the basis 
of the test, it appears that you are not 
biologically related to your father”?  
There may be a good medical reason to 
offer more information, especially if the 
daughter needs to know if her father’s 
chronic kidney disease is somehow 
genetically linked and, that not being the 
case, she need not worry about it and all 
the ramifications it may have for insur-
ability or even securing a job. If there 
is a good medical reason to offer this 
important information, there probably is 
a good moral reason for sharing it. 
We might also ask if there is some 
moral reason to share the information 
about paternity, whether there is a medi-
cal reason or not. Is there a moral reason 
to share the information based, perhaps, 
on the principle of reciprocity: “I would 
want to know, so, therefore, would oth-
ers.” I am not so sure myself, however, 
if I would want to know, and even if I 
did, does that mean other presumably 
rational persons would want to know 
too? If I were a clinician with a long 
term relationship with the daughter, I 
may have a better understanding of the 
daughter’s values and desires and could 
answer the question of reciprocity. Of 
course in this case the daughter and the 
clinician more than likely are strangers 
to each other in a nonetheless potentially 
highly charged situation.
Probably the best approach, which is 
too late in this case, is to be proactive 
in obtaining informed consent for the 
procedure for obtaining the sample. It 
probably is important to tell people that 
non-paternity could be discovered by 
the test and then give them the option 
of whether they would want to know if 
that was one of the results. To have this 
option in the informed consent process 
makes very good sense, especially, as 
genetic counselor colleagues tell me, 
such results from testing are not uncom-
mon.
Since in this case, the informed con-
sent process did not include this option, 
we are still left with a conflict between 
the “right to know” and the principle of 
non-maleficence. It is easy to imagine, 
One of the regular features of the 
Newsletter is the presentation of a 
case considered by an ethics com-
mittee and an analysis of the ethi-
cal issues involved. Readers are 
both encouraged to comment on the 
case or analysis and to submit other 
cases that their ethics committee 
has dealt with. In all cases, identify-
ing information about patients and 
others in the case should only be 
provided with the permission of the 
patient. Unless otherwise indicated, 
our policy is not to identify the sub-
mitter or institution. Cases and com-
ments should be sent to MHECN@
law.umaryland.edu, or MHECN, the 
Law & Health Care Program, Uni-
versity of Maryland School of Law, 
500 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore, 
MD 21201.
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as my colleagues assert, that consider-
able harm could be caused by disclosure. 
Further, the mother, clearly an important 
person in this case, is not even a patient. 
Only the father and daughter are pa-
tients by going through the testing. The 
mother, however, could be harmed by 
the disclosure. Perhaps one could have a 
private conversation with her, letting her 
know of the findings and ask her how 
to proceed? She is the only one who 
presumably would not be surprised by 
the news. But that would entail provid-
ing private medical information (about 
the daughter) such that one would need 
her consent to share it. 
I would tell the daughter that she was 
not a match and that there is no scientific 
and genetic link to her father’s kidney 
disease. I would do that and then change 
the informed consent process, and I 
would not sleep well that night. That is 
what some folks call the moral remainder. 
Brian H. Childs, Ph.D.
Director of Ethics
Shore Health System
University of Maryland Medical System
Easton, MD
*I want to thank the Center for Practical 
Bioethics discussion group for a discus-
sion of this case. I particularly want to 
thank Terry Rosell, John Lantos, John 
Carney and our moderator Rosemary 
Flannigan for their insights.
coMMEnts FRoM 
A GEnEtic coUnsEloR
The issue of the unintended discovery of non-paternity, de-scribed in the case study present-
ed above, is a common ethical dilemma 
faced by genetic counselors.  Interest-
ingly, the case above poses the question 
of who the information should be shared 
with, father or daughter, and with what 
involvement of the mother.  The word-
ing of this question implies that the 
question is to whom the information 
should be disclosed, rather than whether 
the information should be disclosed at 
all.  
This question is particularly interesting 
because historically, genetic counselors, 
MD clinical geneticists and PhD medical 
geneticists believed that non-disclosure 
was preferable because it maintained 
the woman’s confidentiality and did not 
disrupt the family unit (Pencarhina et 
al. 1992; Wertz & Fletcher 1988).  It is 
difficult to determine with any level of 
certainty whether this is still the com-
mon belief, as most institutions now 
have policies which involve discussing 
the potential of identifying non-paternity 
during the informed consent process for 
any test that has the potential to reveal 
this information.  Despite the ideal ap-
proach of preemptive discussion of all 
possible scenarios, incidental findings in 
clinical care and research are, to some 
extent, inevitable.  Once faced with that 
scenario, what becomes paramount is 
how those results are handled.  The best 
approach remains a matter for debate 
with a seemingly endless list of issues 
for consideration.  
Prior to deciding whether or how to 
disclose, one must first consider the 
practical nature of the situation—whether 
it is possible to provide appropriate care 
without disclosing.  That is, whether it is 
possible to disclose the results of the clin-
ical test without disclosing the paternity 
issue.  If it is not possible to do this, then 
non-paternity must be disclosed in order 
to provide standard care.  In some cases it 
may be possible to present a clinical con-
clusion without revealing paternity, for 
example, a donor may be told “you are 
not a match” in a case where a 6/6 match 
is needed to proceed with a transplant but 
only a 3/6 match is expected for a bio-
logical child.  In other cases this may not 
be possible.  For example, if a 3/6 antigen 
match on HLA testing is an acceptable 
match for a donor and testing is done 
only to “confirm” what is presumably 
known, then the identification of non-pa-
ternity would alter the clinical course and 
would need to be revealed.  
In the event that it is not possible, 
without compromising the clinical care 
of the patient, to avoid disclosure of 
non-paternity, there remain many issues 
to consider: autonomy, nonmaleficence, 
deception, non-directiveness versus 
paternalism, risk, magnitude, privacy, 
truth telling and coercion.  Of note, 
many of these considerations can be used 
both in the argument for and against 
disclosure.
When considering autonomy we must 
consider the autonomy of the patient 
awaiting transplant, the autonomy of the 
daughter who is being evaluated as a 
donor, and the wife/mother of the patient/
donor.  By disclosing the false paternity 
we would maximize the daughter’s au-
tonomy as well as the patient’s autonomy. 
Disclosing this information would sup-
port the daughter’s right to the informa-
tion as an individual, potentially give her 
the opportunity to learn about her genetic 
heritage and biological paternal family 
history and would allow her to make an 
informed decision about organ donation 
in light of this new information.  Further 
disclosure would support the patient’s in-
dependent right to know that his daughter 
is not biologically his.  Conversely, if we 
consider the autonomy of the wife/moth-
er, we must respect her independent right 
to conceal this information.
The most common argument against 
disclosure is often that of nonma-
leficence.  Healthcare professionals are 
taught above all to do no harm and in 
situations of non-paternity it is difficult 
to determine with any level of certainty 
whether disclosure will be more or less 
harmful than non-disclosure.  It would 
be unethical to ignore the possibility that 
disclosure could do irrevocable harm to 
the family, the extent of which may not 
be known, but the potential for psycho-
logical, physical, financial or other harms 
have all been considered and discussed 
throughout the literature.    
Deception must be considered from 
both an ethical and practical perspective.  
First, is it ethical to actively deceive a 
patient and provide misinformation or 
limited information in order to hide an 
incidental finding such as non-pater-
nity, and second, it is practical to do 
so?  Consider the scenario wherein our 
transplant patient moves out of state. His 
Case Presentation 
Cont. from page 7
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past medical records are requested by 
the medical center and the new treating 
physician (attempting to be empathetic) 
says, “I see from your chart notes that 
your daughter was going to donate a 
kidney to you but she was not a match, 
it must have been difficult to learn that 
she was not your biological daughter 
while going through the transplant pro-
cess.”   With people moving from one 
area to the other or changing healthcare 
providers due to insurance constraints, 
medical records are actively shared as 
part of patient care on a regular basis.  
Once results have been documented in 
the medical record, it is very difficult 
to ensure that they are always kept 
confidential.  In addition, release of the 
results in this accidental fashion means 
that the information is not likely to be 
disclosed in a sensitive manner with ap-
propriate support.  
In the midst of the considerations 
outlined above we must also consider 
who is the patient, and to whom is the 
obligation to provide care and protect 
privacy.  At first thought, the indi-
vidual awaiting transplant is the patient, 
however, once the daughter agreed to 
testing (in preparation of becoming an 
organ donor), she too became a patient 
of the transplant team.  Since healthcare 
providers are morally obligated to pro-
tect the privacy of each patient, a new 
dilemma becomes apparent—there is no 
way to disclose non-paternity to either 
party without breaching the confidenti-
ality of the other party.     
I have not yet discussed risk, magni-
tude of risk, or coercion.  There is, of 
course, a risk in any situation in which 
sensitive information is at stake, how-
ever, in cases of paternity it is important 
to consider previous interactions with 
the family to determine the magnitude 
of risk.  If there was any suggestion of 
abuse in the past, this should be seri-
ously considered in the determination 
of whether or not to disclose, as one 
can imagine abuse escalating in light of 
such information.  Finally, there is the 
risk of coercion.  Organ donors are more 
likely to be related to the recipient, and 
the likelihood of donating an organ 
diminishes with the degree of related-
ness, therefore, disclosing non-paternity 
may influence the daughter’s interest 
in donating.  Although difficult, the 
healthcare team must attempt to make a 
decision about disclosure that is inde-
pendent from the transplant procedure to 
avoid withholding the information as a 
means of ensuring that the daughter will 
proceed with the transplant.  
In the end, there is clearly no right or 
wrong answer.  There are many ethical 
and moral considerations that could lead 
down either the path of disclosure or 
non-disclosure, so we are left with our 
best judgment, which may be different 
in every case of an incidental finding.  In 
my opinion, once information has been 
identified and documented, it is very 
hard to maintain a secret, and certainly 
there is no guarantee that the secret will 
be kept by others in the future.  As a 
result, I would argue for disclosure.  As-
suming that there is a well established  
relationship between the transplant team 
(including a psychologist) and the father,  
I would suggest disclosing to him first 
and then working with him to develop a 
plan (either with or without him, depend-
ing on his preferences) to disclose to the 
daughter.  I would not involve the wife 
in the initial discussion, as she is not the 
patient, but I would encourage the trans-
plant patient/father to consider speaking 
with his wife and having her involved in 
the disclosure to the daughter. 
Erynn Gordon, MS, CGC
Senior Genetic Counselor
Coriell Institute for Medical Research
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efforts, playing out within the medical 
market place. All of our past reform 
efforts have aimed at achieving an ideal, 
but have typically fallen short. However, 
although we may never successfully 
land on the rocky coast of utopia, that 
does not mean we should not try.
Rebecca D. Elon, MD, MPH
Associate Professor of Medicine
Johns Hopkins University 
School of Medicine
Medical Director, Erickson Health of 
Howard County
Columbia, Maryland
This article was adapted with permis-
sion from a forthcoming article that will 
appear in the Journal of Health Care Law 
and Policy, Vol. 12, Issue 1. All rights 
reserved.
*I feel enormously fortunate that instead of 
dropping out of Medicare, I was given the 
opportunity to participate in a new financial 
model for providing care to frail elders liv-
ing in a general community setting through 
Erickson Health Medical Group. This project 
brings high quality medical care to the Medi-
care population and does so through a mix of 
fee for service and managed care enrollees, 
in collaboration with nursing homes and as-
sisted living facilities, whose residents benefit 
from the model. I am once again hopeful that 
this model will be able to deliver high quality 
geriatric medical care in a community setting 
in a manner that is sustainable, accountable 
and replicable.
REFERENCES
Bok, D. (2001). The Trouble with 
Government. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge Mass.
Health Care Reform 
Cont. from page 5
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JoiNt commissioN Zeroes iN oN disruptive Behavior
A new standard of the Joint Commission taking effect in January, 2009 will require 
hospital administrators to adopt codes 
that define disruptive staff behavior, 
and to develop procedures to discipline 
disruptive staff, including physicians. In 
July, the Commission issued a sentinel 
event alert describing the problem and 
recommending how hospitals should 
handle it. The alert defines disruptive 
behaviors as including “overt actions 
such as verbal outbursts and physical 
threats, as well as passive activities 
such as refusing to perform assigned 
tasks or quietly exhibiting uncoopera-
tive attitudes during routine activities.” 
Examples include “reluctance or refusal 
to answer questions, return phone calls 
or pages; condescending language or 
voice intonation; and impatience with 
questions.” 
The commission recommends that 
hospitals educate staff about acceptable 
behavior, hold everyone accountable, 
and spell out how and when to begin 
disciplinary actions. Hospitals also 
should protect staff members who report 
bad behavior from retribution, and in-
tervene early and in a constructive way 
with those accused of bad behavior.
The impetus for this new standard was 
informed by a survey about physician-
nurse relationships. Rosenstein (2002) 
surveyed staff from 142 acute care, non-
profit hospitals in the U.S.. Of the 2,563 
respondents, over 90% reported witness-
ing disruptive physician behavior, the 
most frequent types being:
• Disrespect
• Berating colleagues
• Use of abusive language
• Condescending behaviors
Disruptive outbursts occurred most 
frequently in operating rooms, medi-
cal-surgical units, intensive care units, 
emergency departments, and obstetrics 
units. About two thirds of respondents 
stated their hospitals had a code of con-
duct prohibiting disruptive behavior, but 
less than 50% thought their code was 
effective. Barriers to reporting disruptive 
behaviors were cited as one reason for 
this. Such barriers included:
• Fear of retaliation
• Belief that nothing ever changes
• Lack of confidentiality
• Lack of administrative support
• Physician lack of awareness  
    or unwillingness to change.
Both physicians and nurses felt that it 
was only a few physicians who exhib-
ited disruptive behavior, and both agreed 
that nurses were also guilty of exhibiting 
disruptive behaviors toward physicians. 
Of concern is that about 37% of respon-
dents believed that nurses were leaving 
their workplace as a result of disrup-
tive behavior. This is cause for concern 
given the current nursing shortage, and 
evidence that higher nurse-patient ratios 
and conducive working environments 
protect against such errors. 
Some physician groups worry that the 
application of disruptive behavior poli-
cies will be too far-reaching, serving to 
silence physicians who speak out in the 
process of advocating for their patients. 
The American Medical Association 
recommends that policies distinguish 
between behaviors that represent good 
faith efforts to constructively criticize 
the workplace versus verbal or physical 
conduct that may negatively impact pa-
tient care. In addition, hospitals should 
verify allegations and discipline hospital 
staff fairly. For example, suspending a 
physician’s hospital privileges should 
only be a mechanism of last resort.
Mechanisms that Rosenstein and 
colleagues (2002) identified to promote 
healthy interdisciplinary staff relation-
ships include:
• Providing opportunities for 
 interdisciplinary communica- 
 tion and collaboration;
• Offering education and training 
 to physicians and nurses in 
 team building, joint collabora- 
 tion, conflict management, time 
 management, stress manage- 
 ment, and phone etiquette;
• Identifying a physician
 champion who can promote 
 nurse-patient collegiality within 
 the institution;
• Getting hospital administra- 
 tion’s support to take disruptive 
 behavior reports seriously;
• Handling reports of disruptive 
 behavior confidentially, with 
 prompt and fair follow-up.
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caleNdar of eveNts
JAnUARY 
12 (5:30 pm - 7:30 pm) Ethics Grand Rounds: "Should Palliative Sedation to Unconsciousness be Limited to a 
 Treatment of Last Resort?" New York Academy of Medicine’s Ethics Grand Rounds. Speaker: Jeffrey Berger, 
 M.D.. 1216 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY. For more information, visit http://www.nyam.org/events/.
26  (3:00 pm)  "Mind Wars: Brain Research and National Defense," Speaker Jonathan Moreno, Ph.D.. Penn State, 
 Foster Auditorium, 101 Pattee Library, University Park, PA. For more information, visit http://www.psiee.psu.
 edu/news/calendar.asp.
FEBRUARY
20-21 Ethics in the Intelligence Community. Sponsored by the International Intelligence Ethics Association, Johns 
 Hopkins University at Mt. Washington, 5801 Smith Avenue, Baltimore , MD. For more information, visit 
 http://www.intelligence-ethics.org/. 
MARch
2-5 4th Biennial Becoming an Ethics Consultant Conference. An Intensive 4-Day Training Course for Healthcare 
 Professionals. Honolulu, Hawaii. Presented by the St. Francis International Center for Healthcare Ethics. For 
 more information, call 547-6050, e-mail info@stfrancishawaii.org, or visit http://www.stfrancishawaii.org/.
6 2009 Ethics Conference in Raleigh, N.C.. Sponsored by the National Association of Social Workers. Visit 
 http://www.naswnc.org/ for more information.
9 (5:30 pm - 7:30 pm)  “Transforming Health Care: Lessons from the West Coast for the East.” New York 
 Academy of Medicine’s Ethics Grand Rounds. Speaker: Benjamin Chu, M.D., M.P.H. 1216 Fifth Avenue, 
 New York, NY. For more information, visit http://www.nyam.org/events/.
31 (7:30 pm)  “The Ethics of Aging,” speaker Carol Hausman Ph.D., gerontologist and founding Coordinator of 
 the Washington Jewish Healing Network. Sponsored by The Hebrew Home of Greater Washington. Jewish 
 Community Center of Greater Washington, 6125 Montrose Rd., Rockville, MD. 
ReconsideRing MaRyland law …
How did the Maryland Patient Care Advisory Committee Act and the Maryland Health Care Decisions Act come to be? How 
do they influence health care ethics committees (HCECs) in Maryland? What goals were HCECs thought to achieve? Are 
they living up to those goals? Are HCEC members who conduct clinical ethics consultations improving the clinical climate 
at their institutions? Are they competent to do ethics consultations? What are “best practice” models for HCECs? Are there 
alternatives to an institutional HCEC? These and other questions were addressed at the December 3 conference, Health 
Care Ethics Committees and Maryland Law – Time for a Change?, sponsored by MHECN in partnership with Harbor Hos-
pital and the Beacon Institute. To view speakers and the conference agenda, visit http://www.law.umaryland.edu/mhecn. 
What did conference speakers and attendees propose as changes, if any, to Maryland legislation impacting HCECs? Stay 
tuned to the next issue of the Newsletter for a recap. 
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